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Highly-skilled people are among the most valuable factors of production in the 
contemporary world economy.  Firms in the U.S. and other high-income countries pay 
substantial amounts (on top of hefty salaries) to cover the legal and transfer costs of non-
citizens whom they want to locate at their home-country facilities.  Governments of 
countries of origin of highly-skilled migrants often offer incentives (both financial and 
non-financial) to induce these migrants to return and to retain future generations who 
would otherwise follow in their footsteps by moving abroad.  The global dispersion of 
highly-skilled work made possible by technological advances, organizational 
restructuring, and the emergence of innovation hubs in new locations has greatly 
intensified these efforts in recent years. 
 
In the short run, this competition is zero-sum, a “war for talent” (in the words of The 
Economist) that may impose significant costs on the losers.  If the losers in this “war” are 
places in which talent is scarce, as seems likely, the process may rob these places not 
only of managers, entrepreneurs, and workers, but reformers and institution-builders as 
well. (Kapur and McHale 2005)  In the long-run, though, talent is a renewable resource, 
since in most countries the fraction of the population with access to educational 
opportunities is far less than optimal.  Properly managed, “brain gain” (Stark 2002) and 
“brain circulation” (Saxenian 2006) may outweigh “brain drain,” making high-skill 
migration into a positive-sum game that benefits both sending and receiving countries. 
 
While the metaphor of “war” is exaggerated, the current international system of 
governance for high-skill migration does not involve very much coordination.  Apart 
from regional free-trade zones and WTO-facilitated reciprocity for a small group of 
senior managers and executives, national policies are determined unilaterally.  
International competition for “brains” may produce some salutary results, inducing 
investments in human capital that would not otherwise have been made.  But there are 
many barriers, ranging from information gaps to institutional bottlenecks, that impede the 
achievement of better outcomes through purely competitive interactions.  Without 
abjuring competition altogether, cooperation on high-skill migration might allow the 
international community to overcome some of these barriers. 
 
This paper will explore the prospects for such cooperation.  It will first survey existing 
mechanisms and processes for cooperation in this area, at the bilateral, regional, and 
global levels.  Bilateral mechanisms include “co-development” and “migration 
management” agreements between sending and receiving countries sought particularly by 
European countries, such as France.  At the regional level, the EU, NAFTA, and APEC 
groupings have varying provisions for regulating mobility.  And, at the global level, the 
GATS negotiations and the Global Forum on Migration and Development have sought to 
develop policies and principles that might eventually serve as the basis for a high-skill 
migration treaty. 
 
The paper will then assess which of these approaches offer the most promising 
opportunities for an improvement over the competitive status quo.  This assessment will 
be based on the scale of potential benefits over the long-run (especially for professional 
fields with large social externalities, such as medicine and education), on the existence of 
shared political interests, and on the administrative feasibility of implementing proposed 
agreements.  The paper will conclude by offering policy recommendations, particularly 
for the U.S. government, which must take a leadership role in this domain, as the world’s 
leading center for knowledge-based industries and its largest recipient of high-skill 
migration. 
 
The data sources for this paper will include official labor force and migration statistics.  
More important, the authors will gather the expert opinions of government officials, 
corporate managers, and non-governmental advocates through interviews in the 
Washington, D.C. area. 
 
Prior research which demonstrates the capability of the proposers to carry out the project 
include Hart’s publications in this area, including articles in Technology in Society and 
Issues in Science and Technology.  Davis is engaged in writing a dissertation on global 
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